Variable population egalitarian ethics and the critical-levela note
- Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo
- Ballester Oyarzun, Miguel Ángel
- Marco Gil, María del Carmen
- Nieto Vázquez, Jorge
Year of publication: 2000
Issue: 13
Type: Working paper
Abstract
This paper explores the introduction of a variable critical-level in a variable population context. We focus the attention on the �Critical-Level Egalitarian Rule�, a social evaluation procedure which compares two social states as follows: (i) It reproduces the leximin criterion when applied to vectors of identical dimension and (ii) otherwise, it completes the small one with so many times a variable critical-level as to make the two vectors equal in size and applies the leximin criterion again. We prove that the use of a strict monotonic critical-level leads to the intransitivity of the social evaluation rule. This problem disappears when a weak monotonicity condition is required.