El contrato de entrada en el capital riesgo y la Teoría Institucional en el contexto español

  1. Ramón Llorens, Mª Camino
  2. Hernández Cánovas, Ginés
Revista:
Intangible Capital

ISSN: 1697-9818

Año de publicación: 2013

Volumen: 9

Número: 1

Páginas: 322-340

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.3926/IC.388 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Intangible Capital

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