Family owners and the appointment of family and non-family women directorsWhere is the ownership point where preferences change?

  1. Emma García-Meca 1
  2. Domingo Javier Santana Martín 2
  1. 1 Universidad Técnica de Cartagena, Cartagena, España
  2. 2 Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, España
Journal:
Revista española de financiación y contabilidad

ISSN: 0210-2412

Year of publication: 2023

Volume: 52

Issue: 1

Pages: 167-186

Type: Article

DOI: 10.1080/02102412.2022.2031508 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

More publications in: Revista española de financiación y contabilidad

Sustainable development goals

Abstract

We analyse the impact of voting rights in the hands of the dominant family owner on the presence of women directors in a sample of listed family firms in Spain during 2007–2020. As distinctive features of this paper, we examine whether women directors have or do not have family ties with the dominant family owner, use the control-chain methodology to identify the ultimate or dominant owner of Spanish listed firms and analyse a curvilinear association between family ownership and the appointment of family and non-family female directors in family firms. Drawing on socioemotional, agency and stewardship theories, our results show that when the voting rights of the dominant families are low, they appoint more female directors with family associations. The results also indicate that when family voting rights are high, family founders appoint more non-family women directors to benefit from their industry-specific expertise and objective advice. Overall, our findings suggest that when a certain level of family ownership is reached there is a need to reduce the appointment of women directors with family ties in order to move towards a more balanced and diversified board with a wider representation of skills, knowledge, diverse experiences and talent.

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